Characterizing EOSIO Blockchain by Huang, Yuheng et al.
Characterizing EOSIO Blockchain
Yuheng Huang
Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications
Haoyu Wang∗
Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications
Lei Wu∗
Zhejiang University
Gareth Tyson
Queen Mary University of London
Xiapu Luo
The Hong Kong Polytechnic
University
Run Zhang
Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications
Xuanzhe Liu
Peking University
Gang Huang
Peking University
Xuxian Jiang
PeckShield, Inc.
ABSTRACT
EOSIO has become one of the most popular blockchain platforms
since its mainnet launch in June 2018. In contrast to the traditional
PoW-based systems (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum), which are limited
by low throughput, EOSIO is the first high throughput Delegated
Proof of Stake system that has been widely adopted by many ap-
plications. Although EOSIO has millions of accounts and billions
of transactions, little is known about its ecosystem, especially re-
lated to security and fraud. In this paper, we perform a large-scale
measurement study of the EOSIO blockchain and its associated
DApps. We gather a large-scale dataset of EOSIO and characterize
activities including money transfers, account creation and contract
invocation. Using our insights, we then develop techniques to auto-
matically detect bots and fraudulent activity.We discover thousands
of bot accounts (over 30% of the accounts in the platform) and a
number of real-world attacks (301 attack accounts). By the time of
our study, 80 attack accounts we identified have been confirmed
by DApp teams, causing 828,824 EOS tokens losses (roughly 2.6
million US$) in total.
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technologies, such as Bitcoin [26], have experienced
much hype in recent years. Blockchain technologies have been
proposed for applications in many areas, including financial and
logistical systems. For example, the Internet giant Facebook re-
cently announced their plans for a cryptocurrency [25]. Blockchain
technologies have found particular popularity with decentralized
application (DApp) developers, most notably for creating smart
contracts. These consist of a decentralised protocol which is capa-
ble of digitally negotiating an agreement in a cryptographically
secure manner. As the most widely used blockchain system after
Bitcoin, Ethereum [27] offers support for executing smart contracts,
yet it suffers from poor performance (as with Bitcoin) due to their
reliance on Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus protocols.
This has motivated researchers to propose new blockchain ap-
proaches that employ more efficient consensus mechanisms. One
particularly prominent example is EOSIO, the largest Initial Coin
Offering (ICO) project to date (over $4 billion). EOSIO adopts a
Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) consensus protocol. This allows
EOSIO to achieve far higher performance throughput, i.e., up to
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8, 000 Transactions Per Second (TPS) within a single thread, and
unlimited for multiple-threaded cases [2]. As a result, EOSIO has
grown rapidly and successfully surpassed Ethereum in DApp trans-
actions just threemonths after its launch (in June 2018). For example,
a recent report demonstrated that the average amount of EOS (the
EOSIO currency) traded in 24 hours has achieved 57 million (with
a peak exceeding 80 million) [19]. As a comparison, Bitcoin has an
average of 825 thousand transactions and Ethereum has an average
of 717 thousand transactions.
Consequently, EOSIO has attracted significant attention from
both industry and research communities alike. Criticisms, however,
have started to emerge, accusing EOSIO of suffering from superficial
prosperity, i.e., that it has a large number of transactions, yet the
majority of users are inactive [3, 28]. Furthermore, recent years
have witnessed attacks against EOSIO, exploiting vulnerabilities
in DApps. This has resulted in millions of dollars lost [15, 18, 24].
Despite these anecdotes [47, 55], we still lack a comprehensive un-
derstanding of EOSIO’s operation in the wild, especially the severity
of problems that EOSIO faces.
To rectify this, we present a detailed study of the EOSIO ecosys-
tem at scale, longitudinally and across various dimensions. To this
end, we first gather a large-scale dataset containing both on-chain
data of EOSIO and off-chain data related to DApps and attacks
(Section 3). Our dataset consists of over 3 billion transactions, over
1 million EOSIO accounts, thousands of bots and a number of attack
reports. Based on the collected dataset, we then perform an explo-
rative study to characterize the activities on EOSIO (Section 4),
including money transfer, account creation, and contract invoca-
tion. Following this, we identify bot-like accounts and fraudulent
activities by mining the relations and behavioral similarities among
millions of accounts (Section 5). We further investigate their in-
centives and purposes. Finally, we characterize security issues in
EOSIO, including permission misuse issues and attacks (Section 6).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive
study of the EOSIO blockchain at scale, longitudinally, and across
various dimensions. We have revealed a range of serious misbehav-
iors on the EOSIO blockchain. Among many interesting results and
observations, the following are prominent:
• The overall ecosystems follows the Pareto principle.
Although the overall ecosystem shows a growing volume of
transactions (over 1 billion transfers), EOSIO is dominated
by a small percentage of accounts. The top 0.47% of accounts
constitute 90% of the total transaction volume. Exchanges
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and gambling DApps dominate the transactions. Over 32%
of the accounts are “silent”: they have never actively ini-
tiated any transaction with other accounts.
• Bot-like accounts are prevalent. We flag over 30.75% of
the accounts (381,008) as bot-like, with over 192 million
transactions, and 640 million EOS transferred. These bots are
mainly used for malicious and fraudulent purposes including
Bonus Hunting, Clicking Fraud, etc.
• Permission misuse issues are overlooked by users.We
identify permission misuse issues of 5,541 accounts, i.e.,
granting their “eosio.code” permissions to other accounts,
which could cause serious security issues (e.g., the accounts
with the granted permission can stealthily transfer users’
EOS tokens even without their attentions).
• EOSIO suffers from a number of serious attacks. We
identify over 301 suspicious attack accounts, causing over
1.5 million EOS losses. We have reported them to the DApp
teams (developers): 80 of the attacks (with 828,824 EOS
losses) have been confirmed by the time of our study. We
further assist the DApp teams in tracing the losses.
We develop core methodologies to trace attacks and fraud, as
well as deriving key insights into EOSIO. Our efforts contribute
developer awareness, inform the activities of the research commu-
nity and regulators, and promote better operational practices across
blockchains.
2 BACKGROUND
We start by briefly presenting key concepts. Note that this is in-
tended as an overview; we refer readers to [16] for full details.
2.1 Overview of EOSIO
EOSIO is a decentralized enterprise system that executes industrial-
scale DApps [21] — software which relies on the EOSIO blockchain
to cryptographically record transactions. The most common trans-
action is transferring the EOSIO currency token, named EOS. In
contrast to Bitcoin or Etherum, EOSIO is a DPoS-based system,
which can scale to millions of transactions per second, making
EOSIO an attractive option for new DApp developers.
There are four key concepts to understand within EOSIO. If
an entity wishes to interact with the EOSIO blockchain, it must
first create an account. This unique identity can then invoke a
smart contract through a transaction, which consists of one more
actions to perform. For example, an action might be transferring
an EOS token from one account holder to another. To enable this
process, accounts wishing to invoke a contract must first delegate
appropriate permissions, granting it the privileges to act on its behalf.
The rest of this section describes in detail these four concepts.
2.2 EOSIO’s Smart Contract and Transactions
EOSIO adopts C++ as the official language for DApp developers
to write smart contracts. In particular, the contract source code
is first compiled down to WebAssembly (aka WASM) bytecode.
Upon invocation, the bytecode will then be executed in EOSIO’s
WASM VM, resulting in transactions recorded on the blockchain,
e.g., transferring EOS. Note that an account can be associated with
no more than one smart contract.
As the basic element of communication between smart contracts,
an action is a base32 encoded 64-bit integer which can be used to
represent a single operation. There are two types of actions: external
action, when the user calls an action directly from the outside; and
an inline action, where an inline action refers to a call to another
action in a smart contract (same or external).
Each transaction can consist of one or more actions. In EOSIO,
there are two ways to send actions for communication: an inline
action that performs an operation within the same transaction as
the original action, and deferred action that might be scheduled to
perform operation in a future (deferred) transaction. Inline actions
are guaranteed to execute synchronously, while deferred actions
will be executed asynchronously if being scheduled. The transaction
will be rolled back if an inline action fails or raises exception.
2.3 EOSIO’s Account Management
In EOSIO, accounts are the entities that can execute transactions.
An EOSIO account is a human-readable name (up to 12 characters)
recorded on the blockchain. In practice, accounts are authorization
structures that can define senders and receivers of contracts. Ac-
counts can also grant permissions to contracts and be configured
to provide individual or group access to transfer/push any valid
transactions to the blockchain.
Note that an EOSIO account is different from (and more com-
plicated than) that of Ethereum. Most notably, accounts are hier-
archical and can only be created by an existing account, thereby
creating a tree structure. This means the resources required to cre-
ate new accounts must be allocated by existing accounts (except
the first privileged account named eosio — the root of the tree —
created by the blockchain system when the mainnet was launched).
This inevitably consumes system resource (RAM) and therefore the
account creation of EOSIO is not free.1
Permissions associated with an EOSIO account are used to au-
thorize actions and transactions to other accounts [37]. Specifically,
the account can assign public/private keys to specific actions, and
a particular key pair will only be able to execute the corresponding
action. By default, an EOSIO account is attached to two public keys:
the owner key (which specifies the ownership of the account) and
the active key (which grants access to activities with the account).
These two keys authorize two native named permissions: the owner
and active permission, to manage accounts. Apart from the native
permissions, EOSIO also allows customized named permissions for
advanced account management.
2.4 Example
Fig. 1 gives an example to demonstrate the relationship between
accounts, associated permissions and authorities. These account
permissions can be delegated to actions, such that transactions
can be performed on their behalf. The left most part of the figure
shows the hierarchical structure (i.e., tree) of the accounts. The
account named alice (marked as grey) is the root of the tree. Alice
has created three other accounts: bob, carol and dave. The central
part of the figure shows that alice has 4 permissions, including
two native permissions (owner and active) and two customized
permission (custom1 and custom2) respectively. The right most part
1More precisely, one has to buy RAM to store the account data [38].
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@alice
@carol
@alice
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owner
active
custom1
custom2
Authorities
@aliceactive authority
threshold
2
accounts/keys weights
bob@active 2
carol@active 2
EOS8RtT... 1
EOS64Zv... 1
…
PermissionsAccounts
…
…
@bob @dave
@xxx @yyy @zzz
…
Fig. 1: An Example of EOSIO Accounts.
of the figure gives the authority table of the grey marked permission
active. This cyptographically states which permissions have been
allocated to the children accounts of alice. Note that there exists a
threshold that must be reached to authorize the execution of the
action. In addition, in order to be executed by or on behalf of alice, a
weight threshold of 2 must be reached as well [37]. The permissions
and authorities will be used in Section 6.1.
3 STUDY DESIGN & DATA COLLECTION
We seek to focus on the following three research questions (RQs):
RQ1 What are the characteristics of accounts and their trans-
action behaviors in the EOSIO ecosystem? No previous
work has characterized the EOSIO ecosystem, including the
health of the platform and the various crypto-assets within.
As previous work has investigated Ethereum [41], we wish
to compare them and understand the difference between
these two blockchain platforms.
RQ2 Howsevere is the presence of bot activities in the ecosys-
tem? As many applications experience a range of bot activi-
ties [10], we wish to investigate whether blockchains are also
inundated with bot activities. Although millions of transac-
tions are emerging on the EOSIO platform, it is unknown
how many of them are manipulated by bots and how many
accounts/activities are fake.
RQ3 Can we identify real-world security issues by analyz-
ing the accounts and transactions we collect? As one of
the most popular platforms for DApps, EOSIO has always
been the target for hackers. A number of reports have al-
ready revealed attacks, leading to millions of dollars lost.
Thus, it is interesting to explore whether we can identify
real-world attacks and build an early warning system.
3.1 Data Collection
To provide a comprehensive analysis of EOSIO, we first seek to
harvest both on-chain data and off-chain information (cf. Table 1):
1) On-chain data of EOSIO blockchain:
• Transaction Records. To enforce a fine-grained analysis, we
use actions to measure the transaction activities because ac-
tions are the basic unit that constitute a transaction in EOSIO,
as mentioned in Section 2. However, due to the volume of
Table 1: Overview of our dataset (on-chain and off-chain).
Category Amount
Action trace 3, 208, 168, 339 actions
Account information 1, 239, 030 accounts
DApp accounts 1, 513 accounts
Bot accounts 63, 956 accounts
Attack accounts 37 accounts
on-chain data, it is not feasible to fetch them either by query-
ing public API endpoints or by crawling from the blockchain
explorer. To solve the problem, we have built a customized EO-
SIO client, which can be used to synchronize with the mainnet
in an efficient way. Note that we also collected all the noti-
fications on the EOSIO blockchain, which could be used to
facilitate the detection of specific kinds of attacks (e.g., Fake
EOS Transfer attack, cf. Section 6).
• Account Information.AnEOSIO account hasmany attributes,
including creation information (e.g., creator and creation time),
owned system resources, assigned keys and permissions. The
creation information can be traced by crawling blockchain
explorers (we take advantage of EOSPark). Other information
can be queried through public API endpoints [9]. Many engi-
neering efforts were required to overcome the heterogeneous
structures of different explorers and APIs. To this end, we have
implemented a generic collector that is capable of crawling
and querying necessary account information.
2) Off-chain data related to DApps, Bots and Attacks:
• DApp Information. As accounts on the EOSIO all have
human-readable names, finding whether an account belongs
to a DApp is more straightforward than Ethereum. By crawl-
ing data from websites including DAppTotal [14] and DAp-
pReview [13], we have annotated accounts with their DApp.
To the best of our knowledge, we have collected the most
complete list of Dapp accounts available.
• Bot Accounts. Blockchain bots have been revealed by DApp
teams and blockchain security companies [28, 34]. We have
collected 63,956 bot-like accounts, which will be used as our
ground-truth in bot accounts identification (cf. Section 5).
• Attack Information. A number of attacks on EOSIO have
already been observed in the wild. To measure the severity, we
collect existing attack information, including date, participants
(victims and attackers) and damage, by monitoring and col-
lecting security news and blogs from well-known blockchain
security companies. Based on this ground-truth dataset, we
implement a monitoring system to perform attack detection
and forensics (cf. Section 6).
In summary, we have collected transactions from 2018.06.09 to
2019.05.31, with over 3 billion actions in total. We also collected
information for all 1,239,030 accounts (including 2, 482, 192 keys).
Moreover, we have collected 1, 513 DApp accounts, 63,956 bot-like
accounts and 40 attack events (including 37 attack accounts).
3.2 Study Approach
To answer RQ1, we are focused on three important behaviors, in-
cluding money transfer, account creation and contract invocation,
mainly based on graph analysis. To answer RQ2, we perform an
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Fig. 2: The Distribution of Money Transfer Over Time.
analysis of the account relationships to pinpoint bot candidates,
and then perform behavior-level similarity comparison to identify
real bot accounts. To answer RQ3, we first provide a taxonomy of
the attacks found in the EOSIO platform. Then we further seek to
explore the characteristics of different kinds of attacks with regard
to their behaviors at the transaction-level. Based on the summa-
rized behaviors, we have implemented a warning system to flag
suspicious attacks and then perform manually verification.
4 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF EOSIO
We first conduct a comprehensive investigation of EOSIO, exploring
money transfers, account creation and contract invocation.
4.1 Money Transfers
4.1.1 Overview of Money Transfers. The total number of money
transfer transactions is over 1 billion (1, 055, 690, 229), and the total
number of EOS tokens being transferred is 15, 190, 552, 483.9523
EOS tokens. This represents over $47 billion market value2 Fig. 3
shows the number of transfers and accounts involved over time.
We see that the number of transfers achieves its peak between
2018.11.09 to 2018.11.14. This is mainly due to the rising popularity
of four gambling games (EOS Max, Dice, FAST and EOSJacks), as
they cover 59.66 % of the total transfers during that time.
Fig. 3: Distributions of Transfer Frequency and Quantity
The distributions of transfer frequency and quantities are further
shown in Fig. 3. The number of accounts involved in transfers
is 944, 907; in other words, 294, 123 (23.74% of all) accounts do
not perform any transactions. Fig. 3(a) shows that the transfer
frequency of the majority of nodes is below 100, which implies
that most accounts are not particularly active. One interesting
detail is that 249, 644 accounts (20.15% of total) exclusively receive
EOS tokens but never transfer them out. Fig. 3(b) also shows the
2We use the price up to October 2019 to calculate the market value
Fig. 4: The Degree Distribution of EMFG.
Table 2: A Comparison of the graph metrics. Note that the
numbers in bold are the metrics of EOSIO graphs, while the
numbers in (brackets) are for Ethereum graphs [41].
Metrics EMFG EACG ECIG
Clustering 0.5049 (0.17) 0(0) 0.2375 (0.004)
Assortativity -0.3392 (−0.12) -0.1539 (−0.35) -0.1834 (−0.2)
Pearson 0.2448 (0.44) /(/) -0.00068(0.11)
# SCC 251,099(466, 095) 1,239,028(622, 158) 610,281(682, 984)
Largest SCC 693,632 (1, 822, 192) 1(1) 688(84)
# WCC 1 (81) 3(22, 260) 3(4, 088)
Largest WCC 944,907 (2, 291, 707) 1,239,028 (126, 246) 611,083 (668, 891)
quantity exchangedwithin each transaction. For the 1 billionmoney
transfers, most are small: over 90% are under 4 EOS. We further
analyze the total amount of money transfers for each account (cf.
Fig. 3(c)), and find that 0.47% of the accountsmake up approximately
90% EOS tokens being transferred, which is a typical Pareto effect.
4.1.2 Graph Modeling of Money Transfers. We next inspect which
accounts perform transfers. To achieve this, we construct a graph
from the set of < f rom, to,value > transaction tuples. However,
this would ignore time information, which is important and nec-
essary to capture abnormal behaviors. Therefore, we construct an
Enhanced Money Flow Graph (EMFG) with timestamps, as follows:
EMFG = (V ,E,D,w),E = (vi ,vj ),vi ,vj ∈ v
The order of the nodes in an edge indicates the direction of
transferred money. Each edge has at least one time attribute d ∈ D,
2018.06.09 ≤ d ≤ 2019.05.31, indicating when the transfer occurs
(UTC time). If account vi transfers multiple EOS to vj across multi-
ple days, there will be more than one timestamp for edge (vi ,vj ).
w : (E,D) −→ R+ associates each edge (vi ,vj ) on a particular day d
with the transfer quantity.
(a) EMFG (b) EACG (c) ECIG
Fig. 5: Visualization of the constructed graphs.
To measure the properties of the financial transactions, we apply
some well-defined network metrics. The clustering coefficient [12]
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measures the tendency that two nodes in a network cluster together;
this is calculated using the approach of [42]. The assortativity coef-
ficient [53] measures the preference for nodes to attach to others,
i.e., a network is assortative when high degree nodes are, on av-
erage, connected to other nodes with high degree, and vice versa.
Assortativity is calculated based on [52]. Pearson coefficient [29]
measures the linear correlation between two nodes. We also ex-
tract the Weakly Connected Components (WCC), and Strongly
Connected Components (SCC). Note that, we will use the same met-
rics to measure the graphs we construct for money transfer, account
creation and contract invocation.
4.1.3 Results of EMFGGraphModeling. Overall, there are 10, 438, 158
edges and 944, 907 nodes. Fig. 5 is a partial visualization of EMFG
with 5, 000 nodes (19, 099 edges) randomly selected. The overall-
degree, in-degree and out-degree distributions of EMFG are shown
in Fig. 4, and all of them satisfy the power law distribution.
The metrics for the constructed EMFG are shown in Table 2.
For context, we compare against equivalent metrics for Ethereum,
taken from [41] (note that although this study was performed in
2018, it still offers a useful comparison). First, we see the EMFG is a
single WCC because of the specific account named eosio (the first
privileged account created by the system), which transferred to
163, 937 other accounts during the mainnet launch. This is different
from Ethereum, which contains 81WCCs. The largest SCC contains
73.41% of all nodes, which is similar to that of Ethereum (86.59%).
Like Ethereum, the fact that one WCC with multiple SCCs means
that EOS tokens can flow from one SCC to another one but will not
be transferred back (i.e., unidirectional transfer).
The clustering coefficient of EMFG is 0.5049, i.e., the likelihood
of triadic closure between accounts, is almost three times as large as
that of Ethereum (0.17 [41]). The negative assortativity coefficient
also implies that high-degree nodes are more likely to connect to
nodes with lower degree. Such a phenomenal may come from the
existence of accounts having one-to-many mapping relationship
with others, such as exchanges, DApp games and some specific
accounts like eosio mentioned earlier.
We also identify the most centralaccounts (measured by PageR-
ank) in the EMFG. For the top-10 accounts, 3 accounts are exchanges
and 4 accounts are gambling DApps. Comparing with the Ethereum
study [41], i.e., 8 exchanges and 0 gambling DApp, the composition
of top DApps suggests that EOSIO is very much about speculation
of value because nearly half of the top DApps are gambling games.
We further analyze the categories of DApp accounts, and find that
the total volume of Gambiling DApps has occupied 78.88% of the
overall DApp volume, which further supports our observation.
Findings #1: Most money transfers via EOSIO are small trans-
fers (< 4 EOS). Although the overall ecosystem shows a promising
volume, EOSIO is dominated by a small percentage of accounts
(i.e., the top 0.47% of accounts cover 90% of the total volume).
Exchanges and gambling DApps dominate the transactions.
Fig. 6: Distribution of Account Creation
4.2 Account Creation
4.2.1 Overview of Account Creation. We next inspect the account
creation properties that we observe. The times series of daily ac-
count creation is shown in Fig. 6. There are several interesting peaks.
The first stems from the token registration during the mainnet
launch. Another peak, arising between 2019.04.23 and 2019.04.29,
may seem a little strange though. 178, 018 accounts were created
during this period, belonging to two wallet accounts: trxcashstart
and eostokenhome. However, only a few accounts were directly cre-
ated by them: 13, 292 for the former and 13, 014 for the latter. The
majority of the remaining accounts (from the 178, 018) were then
indirectly created by the children of eostokenhome. This “spawning”
process is a bi-product of how accounts are created, hence we give
further analysis in Section 5.
This sporadic spawning of new accounts may suggest that not all
are live and active. Hence, we next inspect if they, indeed, perform
any transactions. Although creating an account expends system
resources, the liveness of accounts on EOSIO is far below expecta-
tion. Overall, 31.75% accounts (i.e., 393, 430) are “silent” — they
never actively initiate any transactions with other accounts and
never invoke any smart contracts. The proportion of silent accounts
can therefore be used to reflect the liveness of EOSIO accounts.
Even those accounts that do perform transactions, are rarely used.
66.24% accounts performed 10 or fewer transactions. Such accounts
inevitably undermine the prosperity of EOSIO.
4.2.2 Graph Modeling of Account Creation. Intuitively, the rela-
tionship formed during account creation activities can be modelled
as a graph. This is because new accounts can only be created by
existing ones. Hence, we define and construct an Enhanced Account
Creation Graph (EACG), as follows:
EACG = (V ,E,D),E = (vi ,vj ),vi ,vj ∈ v .
An edge (vi ,vj ) indicates that account vi creates an account vj .
Each edge has a time attribute d ∈ D, 2018.6.9 ≤ d ≤ 2019.5.31
(UTC time zone), indicating when the account is created.
4.2.3 Result of EACG Graph Modeling. We compute our earlier
graph metrics for the EACG, and present them in Table 2. The
EACG consists of 1, 239, 027 edges and 1, 239, 030 accounts in total.
In order to provide a more intuitive understanding of the graph,
Fig. 5(b) gives a visualization for part of EACG. The account named
imtokenstart is selected as the root node, and the graph consists of
16, 382 nodes and their corresponding 16, 381 edges. This account
is an example of a public service for account creation.
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(a) CDF of invocation (b) Distribution of EACG
Fig. 7: Account Invocation and Creation.
We see that the EACG is a single tree when excluding a few
isolated official accounts (eosio.prods, eosio.null), and the root node
of the whole EACG, eosio. Figure 7b shows the distribution of ac-
count trees by depth. We see that EACG is a wide tree with a
few deep paths. We see that from depth 651 to depth 7, 198, there
only exist two paths (see Figure 8). The first path has a root node
named dogaigaohvwj; it has a height of 7, 195, and was created to
transfer illegal profits of a publicly known hacker account hnih-
pyadbunv [6]. This attack was initially reported to include just
2, 190 sub-accounts [7], yet we find this misses 5, 005 accounts. The
second path has a root node named chengcheng21; it has a height of
2, 000. Interestingly, a DApp named VSbet received 95.30% of the to-
tal EOS it transferred out. The activities of these accounts are quite
suspicious. Almost all of them had transactions with VSbet, and the
total amount of EOS they transfer to VSbet was almost identical to
what they received; we later revisit this trend (see Section 5).
(a) subtree of dogaigaohvwj (b) subtree of chengcheng21
Fig. 8: Visualization of the two anomalous paths.
Briefly, Table 3 lists the top-5 central nodes. All listed accounts
are related to public services for account creation, allowing users
to obtain new accounts. The existence of such services breaks the
assumption that any new accounts are controlled by their creators.
As we later revisit, this becomes an obstacle to identify attackers
and bots on EOSIO.
Findings #2: Over 30% of accounts are “silient” and have never
initiated any transactions. The constructed EACG graph is a wide
tree with several deep paths, while the outliers mainly belong to
attack and fraudulent accounts.
Table 3: Top-5 Nodes of EACG using Degree Centrality
Account Outdegree Identity
eosio 163, 946 Official account
senseaccount 50, 531 Sense Chat
eosaccountwm 45, 618 MEET.ONE
eostokenhome 35, 908 ET Wallet
lynxlynxlynx 33, 018 EOS LYNX
4.3 Contract Invocation
Finally, we inspect the contract invocation activities observedwithin
EOSIO. There are 4,453 smart contracts in EOSIO, which have been
invoked 2,140,945,703 times. The time series of contract invocation
is shown in Fig. 9, which shows that creation has been stable after
rapid growth in 2018.
Fig. 9: The Number of Invocation Over Time
4.3.1 Graph Modeling of Contract Invocation. Again, we can model
contract invocations as a graph. Specifically, we define the En-
hanced Contract Invocation Graph (ECIG), as follows:
ECIG = (V ,E,D,A, f ),E = (vi ,vj ),vi ,vj ∈ v .
An edge (vi and vj ) represents that an account vi invokes a smart
contractvj . To facilitate the identification of abnormal behavior, we
annotate each edge with extra attributes. Each edge has a timestamp
attribute d ∈ D, 2018.6.9 ≤ d ≤ 2019.5.31, indicating when the
invocation occurs (in UTC time zone). The name of the function
for each invocation is also recorded as a, a ∈ A. f : (E,D,A) −→ Z+
assigns each edge (vi ,vj ) with a particular day d and given action
a the number of invocation.
4.3.2 Results of ECIGGraphModeling. Overall, there are 4, 313, 739
edges and 611, 085 nodes. Fig. 5(c) is a partial visualization of the
ECIG with 10, 626 nodes (and 19, 079 edges) being randomly se-
lected. We compute our earlier metrics, and present the results in
Table 2. Because of the existence of the system contract, the largest
SCC of EOSIO is larger than that of Ethereum, although there are
only 4, 453 contracts being invoked on EOSIO.
Table 4 lists the top-5 most important nodes in the ECIG. An
intriguing observation is that no exchanges are present in Ta-
ble 4. This is quite different from Ethereum (7 reported by a recent
study [41]). Notice that the number of invocations by these nodes
are quite high compared to their degrees. Combined with the ob-
servation from Figure 7a, we can confirm that most accounts rarely
invoke smart contracts. Obviously, a small set of accounts are much
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more active than the others: the top 0.01% of accounts perform 80
% of contract invocations. Our manual investigation suggests that
there are many bots on EOSIO, as we will explore in Section 5.
Table 4: Top-5 Nodes of ECIG using Degree Centrality
Account Degree # of Invocation Identity
eosio 383, 590 8, 925, 999 Official account
betdicelucky 109, 151 48, 694, 997 DApp Dice
pornhashbaby 107, 417 64, 072, 844 DApp Hash Baby
hashbabycoin 96, 826 31, 380, 78 DApp Hash Baby
endlessdicex 93, 469 23, 955, 881 DApp Endless Game
Findings #3: Although there are only 4, 453 contracts in the
platform, EOSIO has a large number of invocations. A small
number of accounts are much more active than the others. The
top 0.01% of accounts perform 80% of contract invocations, while
the majority of accounts rarely invoke contracts.
5 CHARACTERIZING BLOCKCHAIN BOTS
It is well-known that online activities are impacted by bots [10]. We
posit that these might heavily also impact the EOSIO ecosystem,
and therefore we next investigate how many activities are driven by
bots, and what are their incentives (purposes).
5.1 A Primer on Bots
We define bot-like account as those operated by machines (e.g.,
programs). These are already known to exist in EOSIO, e.g., the fa-
mousDApp team “pornhashbaby” has reported 8 groups of bots, and
each group has hundreds to thousands of accounts [11]. These past
findings have shown that bot accounts usually operate in groups,
and have repetitive behavioral patterns. In this paper, we refer to a
group containing bot-like accounts operated by a controller as a
bot-like community. Note, the bot accounts may be created by the
same controller account (in the same sub-tree of EACG) or by a
number of different accounts (across different sub-trees of EACG).
We will have two complementary approaches to detect them.
5.2 Preliminary Observations
To help distinguish bot accounts from other normal accounts (espe-
cially public account creation services), we perform a preliminary
study of bot activities. We do this by harvesting a number of ground-
truth bot accounts from [11], as well as a well-known blockchain
security company. From this, we gather 63, 863 EOSIO bot accounts
flagged by existing efforts. The accounts were created within 21
bot-like communities. To further differentiate these accounts from
normal ones, we label 229, 907 normal accounts that belong to
25 public contract services (e.g., official account, exchanges, and
pocket) as a white-list for comparison. We then manually inspect
these two groups and make several observations from two perspec-
tives: community-level and account-level.
5.2.1 Community-level Observation. First, controller accounts usu-
ally create a large number of children accounts (bots). For the
flagged 21 controller accounts, the out-degree of them in the EACG
Fig. 10: An Example of difference between bots and normal
users in EOS transfer
varies from 108 to 15,025. In contrast, the average out-degree of the
EACG graph is 30, while the median is only 1. Thus, we argue that
a “shortlist” of potential bot controllers could be identified using
the EACG graph. Note that this is not definitive though — many
non-bots also have high out-degrees. Hence, we turn to our second
observation, where we find that accounts belonging to the same
bot-like community tend to share similar behaviors. For instance,
they might perform transactions on the same day using the same
contract. We posit that this similarity could be used to automatically
group bots belonging to the same controller.
5.2.2 Account-level Observation. We further analyze the bots at
a per-account level. As bot accounts are controlled by machines,
their behaviors usually have regular patterns. Figure 10 shows an
example of a labelled bot account and a normal account. The bot
account has relatively small but very frequent incoming transfer ac-
tivities from February 2019 to May 2019. By analyzing its activities,
we find that it is performing Click Fraud. Each day it transfers a few
EOS to eosvegasjack (an account that belongs to a gambling game)
several times. After each transfer, the bot instantaneously gets its
money back. The time interval between each transfer is also regular
(usually three hours). Thus, we believe that the bot accounts could
be classified based on their behavior patterns, including the active
time, frequency and volume of transfers, etc.
5.3 Detecting bots from community-level
Based on the aforementioned patterns, we next devise a simple
algorithm capable of identifying bot-like communities.
5.3.1 Algorithm Design. Our approach combines both account rela-
tions and behavioral similarities to flag suspicious bot accounts. The
algorithm has two stages. In the first step, we extract all accounts
that have created in excess of 30 new accounts (which is the aver-
age out-degree for nodes in the EACG). This provides a shortlist
of accounts that may be spawning many accounts for use as bots.
However, it is not necessarily accurate, as we have already iden-
tified legitimate services that also spawn many accounts. Hence,
the second step computes the similarity between accounts on the
shortlist to identify groups that operate in similar ways. To measure
this similarity, we compare accounts across two dimensions.
The first dimension is the invocation time and frequency, i.e.,
the time and frequency of invoking smart contracts and transferring
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Fig. 11: Bot-like Communities VS. Normal Communities.
Table 5: Bot-like Communities VS. Normal Ones.
Metrics Bots Normal
Time Features Average 0.09 0.78Std.Deviation 0.08 0.10
Target Features Average 0.03 0.87Std.Deviation 0.05 0.12
money. Specifically, for each account, we summarize its money
transfer actions and smart contract invocations in a feature vector.
For each account on day i , we calculate the frequency of its money
transfer actions, and its smart contract invocations, respectively.
As we have collected all the action records since the launch of the
EOSIO mainnet (which lasts 357 days), the behavior of each account
can be represented in a 714 dimension feature vector ®ti (357 for the
money transfer actions, and 357 for the contract invocations).
The second dimension is the contract target of the transactions.
This is because accounts belonging to the same bot operator might
invoke the same smart contracts. There are currently 4,453 unique
smart contracts in the EOS ecosystem. Thus, for each account i , we
represent its targets in a 4,453 dimension vector ®si . Each dimension
represents the number of times that the account has invoked the
corresponding smart contract.
The above provides two dimensions for which we can compute
similarity between potential bot accounts. We use cosine distance to
measure the similarity between feature vectors. Considering there
are a number of accounts in a potential bot-like community, we
further calculate a group similarity for each of them as follows: (1)
For a community with N non-silent nodes,3 we calculate the feature
vectors ®si ∈ S and ®ti ∈ T for each node. (2) We further calculate
the median vector ®m, ®m = 1N
∑N
j=1 ®vj for vectors in S and T . (3)
We then measure the average distance between each vector and
median vector. dist = 1N
∑N
j=1 cosineDist(®vj , ®m). As a result we get
the overall distS and distT for S and T. Note that dist ∈ [0, 1], where
larger values means less similarity.
5.3.2 Defining the Similarity Threshold. The above allows us to
compute the similarity between accounts. The next step is to define
an appropriate threshold of similarity that warrants a community
of accounts being classified as bots. Here we take an empirical
approach, relying on our ground-truth dataset of bots and normal
3We have removed “silent” nodes, as such nodes have no actual behaviors to measure.
accounts (from Section 5.2). Note that this covers 21 bot communi-
ties (63,863 accounts) and the 25 normal ones (314,277 accounts).
Figure 11 presents the similarity across these 46 groups. Groups
that fall on the lower left have tightly correlated behavior. Specifi-
cally, the x-axis represents the average distance of the action target
feature vectors, and y-axis represents the average distance of the
action time and frequency vectors.
Note that by ChebyshevâĂŹs Theorem, even for non-normally
distributed variables, at least 88.8% of cases should fall within prop-
erly calculated 3σ intervals. Hence, we use the similarity score
ranges between -3σ and +3σ of the average as our threshold to
filter bots (see the rectangular frame in Fig. 11). Any groups of
accounts that fall into this range are deemed to belong to the same
bot groups.
5.3.3 Analyzing the Public Key. We also observe that some users
re-use the same public-private key pair across multiple accounts.
Hence, as a final step, we group all the flagged bot-like accounts
sharing the same public key into a community.
5.3.4 Results. Using the above techniques, we identify 351, 560
bot-like accounts, which cover 28.37% of all accounts in the EOSIO
platform, and belong to 2, 363 communities. The number of accounts
in the identified bot communities varies from 30 to 15, 025 .
5.4 Detecting bots from per-account level
Bot accounts are not always created by the same controller account.
For example, DApps like MEET.ONE and Infinitowallet sometimes
provide free accounts to attract users. Thus, bonus hunters would
take advantage of this opportunity to create free bot accounts. In
this case, the bot accounts may reside within the ACG trees mixed
up with normal accounts. To overcome this, we must also perform
per-account detection.
5.4.1 Algorithm Design. To differentiate accounts within the same
ACG tree, we formulate the problem as a binary classification task.
Based on the graphs we constructed, we summarize 11 key account
features in Table 6. We describe some representative features here.
For EACG, the ACG depth describes the depth of the account in
EACG. Bots appear to be deeper in the tree. For EMFG, as illustrated
in Fig.10, bots usually receive EOS more frequently than normal
accounts. So we use features like transferIn std to describe the
standard deviation of transfer volume over time. The amount of
EOS per transfer for bots is also much lower than that of normal
ones. Thus, we summarize the volume per transferIn as a feature. For
ECIG, it appears that bots are more active than normal accounts, i.e.,
the active day is 74.6% (bots) VS. 13.4% (normal) on average. In other
words, bots are more active than normal accounts. We use activate
time to describe the activity. The average values of aforementioned
features in the labeled dataset are shown in Table 6.
Using these features, we train a random forest to classify ac-
counts into bots vs. non-bots. After performing a random shuffle,
we split our labeled dataset to training (80%) and test (20%) sets. Af-
ter doing grid search for the best parameters, we finally get 99.56%
accuracy on the test set. We will release the benchmark and the
classifier to the community.
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Table 6: Features we used to classify bot accounts.
feature bots (avg) normal (avg)
ACG depth 4.3 1.8
transferIn std 40.8 954
transferOut std 57.3 1267.3
volume per transferIn 2.2 104
volume per transferOut 6.2 553.1
transfer target num 5.9 12.6
invoke contract num 16.1 3.2
invocation num 518.5 2312.7
invocation std 6.2 40.3
activate time 74.6% 13.4%
siblings in same day 1724.1 117024.4
5.4.2 Results. We use the classifier to identify bot accounts in the
remaining 486, 328 accounts. We discover 29, 448 new bots. When
merged with the community-level results, we identify 381,008
bot accounts in total. These accounts have invoked 192, 330, 821
times, and the amount of transferred EOS is 639, 517, 282.
5.5 Validating Bot Accounts
Before continuing, it is important to validate that the above ap-
proaches effectively identifies bot accounts. We use three methods.
First, we compare our results against the ground-truth bot accounts
(see Section 5.2), to find that we gain 100% accuracy — all 63, 956
ground-truth bot accounts are identified by our techniques. In fact,
by only using the random forest approach on the per-account level,
we could achieve an accuracy of 99.51%. Second, we have reported
a number of bot communities to the DApp developers and one
anonymized blockchain security company, and all of them were
confirmed as bots. Third, we randomly select 100 bot-like account
communities for manual examination. We are confident that over
88% are indeed bots, and we are able to know their purposes (see
Section 5.6). For a further 12% of the bot-like accounts, although we
cannot reverse engineer what they are doing, we are able to identify
some bot-control clues, e.g., the accounts have similar names, a
large number of accounts were created at the same time, etc. We
will release our detection result.
5.6 Applications of Bot Accounts
We next examine the purposes of these bot accounts. We manually
sample 100 bot communities, and examine their actions, identifying
4 major categories, which we subsequently formulate automated
methods to detect. Table 7 provides a summary of these categories,
highlighting their significant impact of the wider ecosystem. Below,
we discuss each category.
5.6.1 Bonus Hunters. We find many bot groups performing bonus
hunting. This involves exploiting incentives in DApps, in order to
gain profit. This is because EOSIO DApps often offer incentives to
attract users, including: (1) Login bonus: a reward given to users for
logging into DApps daily. For example, DApp BingoBet offers users
one free lucky draw every day. Users can get free EOS from 0.0005
to 50.0. (2) Free tokens: some DApps hand out tokens to attract active
users. For example, PRA Candybox offers each user a limited chance
to get free tokens. In general, each account can only get a limited
number of tokens, so by creating multiple bots, a controller can
make more profit. (3) Invitation rewards: some DApps give rewards
for inviting friends. For example, Hash Baby offers 5% of its total
tokens to those who invite friends. Thus, bots could create a large
number of accounts and invite them in order to gain profit.
Although we have manually identified many bonus hunters, it is
non-trivial to automatically identify them. Here, we propose a semi-
automated but effective approach. One feature of bonus hunter bots
is that they invoke some specific contracts with a high frequency,
or they will invite other “similar” accounts to invoke the contracts.
Thus, we first rank the bot-like accounts by their frequency of
contract invocations, and then check the most popular DApps they
invoke. For the top DApps, we then check to confirm whether they
offer the aforementioned incentives. As a heuristic, we assume that
bot communities targeting these apps are likely bonus hunters. To
gain an upper estimate of how many bot communities are bonus
hunters, we compute the proportion of money hunting actions for
each account. We consider anything above 50% to be indicative of
a likely bonus hunter. Through this, we identify 158,147 accounts
belonging to this category. It accounts for 36.55% of all bot-like
accounts. These accounts contribute the second largest number of
invocations (30.43%).
5.6.2 Click Fraud. The second largest use of bots is for click fraud.
These accounts create “fake” traffic in order to promote the ranking
of certain DApps. One major characteristic is that the amount of
EOS they transfer to DApps is almost identical to what they receive
from the same DApps. We also observe that these accounts are quite
ephemeral, i.e., they become active for a few days and then become
“silent”. This results in the rank of the targeted DApp being boosted
temporarily during the active days.
The most extreme case is the EOS Global, which ranks 3rd among
all DApps on 2019-4-27 (on DappTotal). Using our EMFG, we find
that account “egtradeadmin” (belonging to EOS Global), ranks #1
among all accounts using PageRank. However, the transaction be-
haviors of “egtradeadmin” are typically bot-like. To highlight this,
Fig. 12 shows the money transfer and account creation behaviors
of EOS Global. A significant peak can be witnessed between 2019-
04-23 and 2019-04-30. The accounts contributing were flagged as
bot-like accounts using our approach, as since their creation, they
have transferred a great deal of EOS to the EOS Global DApp, and
received almost identical Figure EOS from EOS Global in return.
We define a heuristic to classify bot-like accounts in this cate-
gory. We simply check their balance (transfer in vs. transfer out) to
identify whether they are suspicious. Accounts with a similar ratio
(over 95%) are deemed to be performing click fraud. Note that, we
have filtered bot-like communities that have very few transfers (e.g.,
<10 EOS) to remove potential false positives. We identify 139, 271
bot-like accounts belonging to this category. They have created
80, 035, 916 invocation, with an amount of 236, 607, 485 EOS.
5.6.3 DApp Team Controlled Accounts. We also observe that some
bot-like accounts are controlled by DApp teams. By analyzing the
behaviors of such accounts, we see that they are mainly used for: (1)
Debugging: These bots are used to run automated product quality as-
surance tests within theDApp. For example, account “zhaojingdong”
has created 2,001 bot-like accounts, and these accounts are used
to invoke the debug interface of the smart contract “fastwinhold1”
(fastwinhold1::debug), with 19,299 invocations. The “fastwinhold1”
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Fig. 12: An Example of the Click Fraud (EOS Global).
is a smart contract that belongs to Dapp Fast. (2) Interacting with
users: These accounts are created to support user-based activities
within DApps. There are also other cases where DApp Games can-
not find enough real players (especially during cold start), so they
generate bots to interact with real users. (3) Control: These bot ac-
counts are mainly used to either vote for themselves or run DApps
of their own. These accounts have the same public key with DApp
accounts, e.g. “eosiomeetone”, “eosasia11111”. As the EOS inherits
DPoS and only 21 block producers can be elected, these accounts
are used to perform self-voting.
As we have collected the DApp info, Team Controlled Accounts
can be verified easily. We have identified 19,567 accounts (5.14%)
belonging to this category. Note that these accounts invoke smart
contracts with high frequency (52,307,259 times in total), which
represents 27.20% of the overall bot-like invocations.
5.6.4 Account Sellers. Account Sellers involve creating large num-
bers of accounts with names that are perceived to have potential
future value, as names are unique in EOSIO and cannot be reused.
Account Sellers therefore bid for account names from the EOS au-
thority, and then sell them for a higher price. The public key of the
accounts are identical and only after they are sold out will they
change their keys. We identify these account sellers by examining
the websites of each DApp, as they will advertise their ability to
sell accounts. From this, we have identified 15,496 accounts in total.
5.6.5 Others. 12.74% of the bot-like accounts (48,527 accounts,
248 communities) remain uncategorized, as we cannot identify
generalizable traits that might reveal their motivation. That said,
we are nevertheless confident that they are bots. From this group,
we manually sample 11,948 bot accounts (132 communities), and
observe several clues that give weight to this confidence: (1) A large
portion of these bot communities (35.47%) have confusingly similar
names. For example, accounts created by gotolab12345 are named
things like gotolabms221, gotolabms222, while for normal accounts,
we rarely see this. (2) The account creation time of most of the
bot communities (64.53 %) is extremely intense, making normal
human involvement unlikely, e.g., account aaa1bbb1ccc1 created
523 accounts in a few hours.
6 MEASUREMENT OF SECURITY ISSUES
In this section, we study the security issues of EOSIO by inves-
tigating both the on-chain and off-chain data we collected. We
first explore the permission misuse phenomenon, and then focus on
real-world security attacks that we observe in the wild.
Table 7: A Summary of the bot-like accounts.
Category # Accounts (%) # Invocations (%) # Volume (EOS)
Bonus Hunter 158,147 (41.51%) 58,521,684 (30.43%) 57,460,802(8.99 %)
Click Fraud 139,271 (36.55%) 80,035,916 (41.61%) 236,607,485(37.00 %)
Dapp Team 19,567 (5.14%) 52,307,259(27.20%) 322,731,329(50.46 %)
Account Seller 15,496 (4.67%) 327,192 (0.17%) 3,531,674(0.55%)
Others 48,527 (12.74%) 973,391 (0.51%) 19,185,992(3.00 %)
Total 381,008 192,330,821 639,517,281
6.1 eosio.code Permission Misuse
6.1.1 Overview of Permission Mechanism. EOSIO supports a per-
mission system that can control access to contracts (Section 2.3).
Users can modify their account permission group and link each
permission to different kinds of action. For the default setting, only
the owner key can sign the updateauth action to change the private
key of an account, yet custom permissions are incredibly flexible
and address numerous possible use cases when implemented. Most
notably, the eosio.code permission is designed to enable contracts to
execute inline actions. However, once a user grants this permission
to a contract, it can call system contracts in the name of the user.
This means that the eosio.token permission can be assigned to trans-
fer EOS tokens without notifying the user. For example, this type of
permission misuse has been discovered in a popular DApp named
EOS Fomo3D (whose account name is eosfoiowolfs), which caused
serious security threats that many users stop using it [35].
(a) permission assignment (b) permission misuse
Fig. 13: Illustration of permission misuse
6.1.2 Overview of eosio.code Permission Misuse. Fig. 13 illustrates
how eosio.code permission misuse occurs. First, a smart contract de-
clares that the eosio.code permission is needed in the code. A users
then grants eosio.code during the contract invocation, through an-
other two permissions, i.e., owner and active. Specifically, users first
link the eosio.code of one contract to the owner/active permission
using updateauth action (Figure 13a). By doing so, for every action
signed by owner/active, the smart contract can invoke inline actions
in the name of user (Figure 13b).
The above is is typically used for convenience, e.g., allowing a
game to automatically initiate transfers. However, in practice, the
permission opens up a number of attacks. The community suggests
that contract developers should get rid of eosio.code [22, 23], and
recommends users to reserve their eosio.code permissions unless
they trust that contract.
6.1.3 Detecting eosio.code PermissionMisuse. As permission changes
are related to action updateauth, we can track on-chain data to see
whether there exists any permission misuses. Once we find an ac-
count grants the eosio.code permission to smart contract accounts
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Table 8: Top accounts with granted eosio.code permission.
linked permission Account # auth account Identity
active
fastwincpuem 1, 453 gambling game
fastwincpu11 1, 231 gambling game
zyixjmpxrrpr 672 gambling game
exchangename 626 Account exchange
lihaihai1234 494 gambling game
with different public keys4, we identify this behavior as a potential
permission misuse. As aforementioned 2.3, there exists a threshold
that must be reached to authorize the execution of the action. Thus,
only when the assigned permission weight surpasses the permission
threshold can another account invoke the corresponding permis-
sion. Otherwise, it may require several accounts to authorize a
permission invocation together. As a result, for each permission
grant, we further analyze the weight of the accounts who have been
granted the eosio.code, and then compare it with the user-defined
threshold, to identify the permission misuse finally.
Fig. 14: Visualization of the permission misuse.
6.1.4 Results. In total, we have collected 327, 287 updateauth ac-
tions. Among them, 26, 899 are associated with the permission
eosio.code. After filtering out actions whose granted weight is lower
than the threshold, we identify 18, 321 permission grant actions in
total, and 72.25% of them are linked to active permission. Thus, we
have identified 13,237 permission misuse in total, involving 5,541
user accounts, who grant their permissions to 407 smart contracts.
The top 5 contracts that have been granted eosio.code with active
are shown in Table 8. Figure 14 illustrates the permission misuse
graph, with each node denotes an account, and each edge repre-
sents a permission grant action. We observe that most of the smart
contracts that require sensitive permissions are gambling games
(i.e., 4 in Top-5). Contract fastwincpuem is the most representative
one. To play the game, over 1,400 users have to grant the permission
to it, which pose serious security risks.
6.2 Real-World Attacks
Although a number of security reports [15, 18, 24] have revealed
attacks, it is still unknown how prevalent they are. By surveying 37
attack reports [30, 33], we next manually classify attacks into two
main categories: Unchecked Input Attacks and Predictable State At-
tacks. Using these observations, we have implemented a monitoring
system to identify suspicious actions and accounts.
4Note that we compare the public keys of the involved accounts in order to filter the
valid permission grants for users with multiple accounts.
Table 9: Patterns of Fake EOS Transfer/Notice Attacks.
Pattern Fake EOS Transfer Fake EOS Notice
The transfer token symbol is EOS. ✓ ✓
Whether the contract executes “transfer” action
is the official contract (eosio.token) or not. No Yes
The notice receiver is the victim, rather
than any accounts involved in the transfer. ✗ ✓
6.2.1 Unchecked Input Attacks. We identify 4 samples of attacks
that exploit unchecked inputs [17]. These rely on victim contracts
failing to properly validate the identities of received tokens or noti-
fications [17]. It has two variants: (1) Fake EOS Transfer Attack,
which transfer fake EOS tokens to deceive the victim contract into
believing that it is receiving EOS tokens [4]. (2) Fake EOS No-
tice Attack, which sends fake notifications to deceive the victim
contract into believing that it is receiving EOS tokens [5].
We devise a pattern-based mechanism to detect these two types
of attacks, by looking for the patterns summarized in Table 9 [4, 5].
✓ means the pattern is applicable to detect that particular attack,
whereas ✗ indicates that the pattern is not applicable. In addition,
pattern with Yes means the condition must be met; alternatively,
pattern with No has to be otherwise satisfied. In total we have 2
patterns for the Fake EOS Transfer Attack and 3 patterns for the
Fake EOS Notice Attack respectively. Note that the aforementioned
patterns may lead to false positives. For instance, the transfer token
symbol can always be specified as “EOS” by the sender for any
non-malicious (e.g., testing) purpose. Thus, we further use heuristic
strategies to alleviate this issue. Specifically, for the fake EOS transfer
attack, if an account A sends fake EOS tokens to account B, and on
the same day account A makes profit from B, we then mark A as
suspicious. Similarly, as to the fake EOS notice attack, we further
verify all accounts that have sent fake EOS notice to a DApp’s
account. These heuristics can identify all 4 unchecked input attacks.
6.2.2 Predictable State Attacks. We collect 33 samples of attacks
that rely on predictable state. These include variations such as: (1)
The Random Number Attack, which exploits the vulnerabilities
present in the procedure to generate random numbers. (2) TheRoll
Back Attack, which defrauds the lottery game without actually
paying the bet cost by rolling back the corresponding unsatisfied
reversible transaction [31, 32]. (3) The Transaction Congestion,
which launches a DoS attack by sending a large number of deferred
transactions based on the predictable state, to force the victim
contract to regenerate a different result [20]. This attack is usually
targeted at gambling games (32 out of 33 attack gambling games).
Such attacks cannot be identified using the heuristics in Sec-
tion 6.2.1. Hence, we turn to another intuition: accounts with large
profits in a short period of time with high frequency may be suspicious.
This assumption, however, could lead to many false positives. To
investigate this, we manually analyze the collected attack accounts
and summarize several characteristics:
(1) Although the profit attackers earn varies widely, their prof-
itability ratio5 is relatively high. In contrast, even though a
normal account has the potential to earn high profits (e.g., if
its wins a large bet), it is unlikely that normal accounts con-
sistently maintain a high profitability ratio. For the collected
5Here, we define the ratio as the amount of EOS received over the amount of EOS sent.
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attacks, the median profit is 2, 202 EOS, and the median of
profitability ratio is 2.4.
(2) Attacks usually happen over a relatively short time (e.g., from
a few minutes to an hour). This is quite different to other
normal behaviors. As a reference, all the 33 Predictable State
Attacks finish within an hour.
(3) The total amount of the “excessive” profit always makes-up
a large portion of the total volume of the transactions for the
account with the target DApp. Because attack accounts are
usually active for just a few days. Once attackers succeed,
they usually do not use the Dapp anymore. In contrast, nor-
mal users with high profits have no reasons to be “silent”.
Based on these observations, we are able to propose a semi-
automated approach to label suspicious accounts, as follows:
Step 1.We first monitor the accounts (in the EMFG) that gain
high profit with a high profitability ratio. For a given account, if
the profit is larger than a thresholdW1 and the profitability ratio
is larger than a thresholdW2 in some granularity of time period,
we mark it as suspicious. In particular, we specify two kinds of
granularity: one day for the coarse-grained detection and an hour
for the fine-grained detection, to achieve a good accuracy with
acceptable performance. Note that, we empirically setW 1 = 400,
W 2 = 1.2. This is a looser boundary (compared with known attacks)
to identify as many suspicious accounts as possible. This step is
capable of filtering out most of the unrelated normal accounts.
Step 2. For a given flagged victim DApp candidate, we record
the profits and the corresponding dates for all suspicious accounts.
For each suspicious account, we further calculate the proportion of
profits (denoted by p) over the total incoming EOS tokens received
from that DApp. An account will be labelled as highly suspicious
and require further verification if p is larger than a thresholdW3,
which gives the liveness of one account to some extent. We empiri-
cally setW 3 = 0.9, i.e., the excessive profits must have occupied at
least 90% of all the money transfers. As a reference, for the collected
attack accounts, all of them have achieved 100% on this metric.
Step 3. The aforementioned profit-driven approaches are able to
identify most of the attacks, as the sole purpose of the attacks we
considered is to make profit. However, it is quite possible that we
may include some benign behaviors, due to the limitation of the
thresholds we defined. Thus, to filter out possible false positives,
our last step is to manually analyze the remaining suspicious attack
accounts and their behaviors. Note that, previous steps have filtered
most of the accounts and actions, making our manually analysis
possible. Our goal is to either replay the “attacks” they performed, or
find more evidences, to confirm whether a suspicious account fulfills
the characteristics of the attacks.. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the only reliable way to label attacks.We employ three techniques.
(1) Random number attacks can be reproduced on the testnet we
built. Thus, for each suspicious account, we first analyze whether it
targets a gambling Dapp. Then we repeat its actions to see whether
we are able to launch random number attacks. We have imple-
mented Proof-of-Concept (PoC) scripts on our testnet to verify the
random number attacks are indeed performed. Our implementation
follows some attack scripts provided by the community [8]. (2) For
the roll back attack, we take advantage of the EOSIO client we
customized to synchronize with the mainnet. Although roll back
Table 10: Top-3 attack accounts identified.
Attackers target profit confirmed
hnihpyadbunv Dapp Dice 195, 530 Yes
ilovedice123 EOSBet 137, 970 Yes
eykkxszdrnnc EOS Max, BigGame 71, 731 Yes
actions will not be put on the chain, they will be broadcast and
a client could receive them. For each account, we further analyze
their broadcast information. If one account has too many roll back
transactions with a high profit, we believe it launches roll back
attacks. (3) The transaction congestion attack is quite noticeable, as
attackers usually create thousands of deferred transactions and may
even paralyze the whole mainnet. Thus, for each account, we ana-
lyze its deferred transactions to see whether it performs DDoS-like
attack. In brief, the manual investigation allows us to determine the
attacks, the corresponding attack accounts, and the victim DApps.
6.2.3 Detection Result. Using the above detection mechanisms, we
identify the presence of attacks across the entire EOSIO blockchain.
We discover 301 attack accounts associating with 1, 518, 401 EOS
tokens (roughly 4.8 million US$). Table 10 lists the top-3 of them.
Specifically, we discover 24 attack accounts associated with 136, 881
EOS tokens for the fake EOS transfer attacks, and 28 attack accounts
associating with 235, 867 EOS tokens for the fake EOS notification at-
tacks respectively.6 Furthermore, we found 251 accounts (1, 070, 005
EOS tokens) that rely on predictable state.
These attacks are targeting 112 victim DApps. Note that, we
report all the identified attacks to the corresponding DApp teams.
By the time of our study, 80 attack accounts have been confirmed
by them, causing 828, 824 EOS tokens in losses (roughly 2.6 million
US$). For the remaining attack accounts being detected, We are still
working with DApp developers to make final confirmation.7 Apart
from notifying the DApp developers for a timely damage control, we
also assist them in tracing the losses and provide a digital forensic
service to support advanced collaboration with other third parties
like exchanges. For example, we have assisted the development
teams of DApp BetDice, ToBet, EOS MAX, BigGame in tracing the
losses of 288,329 EOS by providing them attack evidence.
7 LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Limitations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first com-
prehensive study of EOSIO. However, our study carries some limi-
tations. In several cases, we have relied on heuristics and manual
validation. This was necessary due to the paucity of ground-truth
data. For example, for the bot-like account detection, we have tried
our best to validate our approach, however, it is impossible for us
to make sure all accounts flagged are truly bots. Similarly, although
we only focus on bot-like accounts that operate in groups and have
similar behaviors, it is possible that there are bots that do not fall
into this definition. We raise similar observations regarding our
attack detection. We have applied heuristics to flag accounts that
are suspicious, and relied on manual efforts to confirm them. This,
of course, might not be scalable and could mean that we only offer
6Two accounts are related to both fake EOS transfer and fake EOS notification attacks.
7Some DApp teams are no longer active due to the financial loss of attacks.
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a lower-bound. Future work will involve incorporating program
analysis and dynamic testing techniques to help us automatically
identify attacks.
Implications. Our observations are of key importance to stake-
holders in the community. First, considering the large number of
fraudulent behaviors and security issues we discover, the gover-
nance of EOSIO needs to be improved. Second, we argue DApp
developers should take actions immediately to address the security
issues introduced by vulnerabilities of smart contracts. Third, as
mentioned earlier, we provide a digital forensic service to help de-
velopers recoup the losses by collaborating with other third parties
like exchanges. As of this writing, we have helped four DApp teams
in tracing the losses by providing them attack evidence. Moreover,
our findings could help users and investigators to understand the
status quo of EOSIO ecosystem, and protect them from being de-
ceived by some “popular” DApps. Last but not least, our findings
and techniques could be generalized to other blockchain platforms
as well. For example, it is reported that blockchain bots were also
found in the TRON DApp ecosystem [36]. Our observations and
techniques could be easily adopted to detect them.
8 RELATEDWORK
Transaction-based Analysis. Previous researchers have investi-
gated blockchain systems by performing transaction-based anal-
yses. Several works focus on Bitcoin [39, 43, 51, 54, 57, 58, 62],
including de-anonymization and money laundering detection, by
using graph-based approaches. Researchers have also investigated
Ethereum by using transaction-based analyses [40, 41]. For example,
Chen et al. [41] gives a graph-based analysis of Ethereum, which is
somewhat similar to our approach in Section 4. However, our work
differs from previous studies because of the differences between
EOSIO and other platforms. More importantly, we have proposed
systematic approaches to successfully identify and measure bot-like
accounts and malicious accounts that have never been identified
before. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive
work to study behaviors on EOSIO in a systematic manner.
Vulnerability/Attack Detection. There are a number of stud-
ies focus on analyzing the vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart con-
tracts [45, 46, 49, 50, 59–61]. For example, Luu et al. [50] built a
symbolic execution tool to discover potential vulnerabilities. Kalra
et al. [46] provided a static analysis tool to detect vulnerable smart
contracts based on LLVM. He et al. [44] characterized code-clone
based vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts. Regarding EO-
SIO, however, most are reports [1, 4, 5, 20, 31, 32] focusing on
attack/vulnerability analyses by security companies; only a few
academic publications [48, 56] are available. Lee et al. [48] intro-
duced and studied four attacks stemming from the unique design of
EOSIO. Quan et al. [56] focused on detecting two types of vulnera-
bility for EOSIO smart contracts. A number of previous works have
proposed tools to detect vulnerabilities by performing static analy-
ses. In contrast, we adopt a statistical approach to detect attacks by
analyzing the anomalies.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have performed the first large-scale measurement
study of the EOSIO blockchain. By constructing a comprehensive
dataset, we first analyzed the activities including money transfer,
account creation and contract invocation. We further focused on
security and fraudulent issues, including bot-like accounts and at-
tack detection. Our exploration has identified many security issues
and revealed various interesting observations, including thousands
of bot accounts, hundreds of real-world attacks, as well as insights
for future research directions.
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